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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
Beckerman,9 a New York case, Rothman and Schneider agreed to dissolve the
corporation, and to place full control of the corporation's affairs in Schneider
in the interim period. The Court of Appeals, after an express acknowledgment
of this placement of control, then stated the holding relied on by the court
in the present case, namely, "Where there has been no direct prohibition by
the Board... the president has presumptive authority ... to ...prosecute
suits in the name of the corporation." 10 In the present case, however, there
was no such placement of control in the president, and therefore, the validity
of the reliance, by the Court, on the holding of the Rothman case appears
difficult to justify:
The third instance in which presidential authority to institute suits may
be implied, arises when the president has been charged with special duties,"-
which by their nature, virtually require the institution of court proceedings,
such as to dispose of corporate property,' 2 this being practically impossible
without implied authority to try the title thereto. Obviously, the West Hills
case does not meet this criterion.
This discussion does not mean to imply that these are the only three
instances in which such presidential authority may be implied. However,
these authoritative groupings, along with Section 27 of the New York Stock
Corporation Law, do tend to show that such authority will and should be
implied only when the circumstances of the corporation are either very grave
or quite exceptional. However, in the present case, the fact that the president
was opposed by the other two stockholders appears to present circumstances
which are neither grave nor exceptional. Therefore the dissent by two of the
Justices seems to be more accurate than the decision of the majority.
ARBITRATION AS AN INCIDENT OF WINDING UP
A written agreement between a contractor and a corporate sub-contractor,
contained a provision providing for the arbitration of all disputes arising there-
under. The contract also contained a clause prohibiting the sub-contractor
from subletting, assigning or otherwise transferring the contract without the
contractor's prior consent. This latter clause was to be non-arbitrable.
The Court in Ehrlich v. Unit Frame and Door Co.,'3 was confronted with
a question as to whether the voluntary dissolution of the corporate sub-
contractor, precluded such corporation from demanding arbitration. Ehrlich
claimed, on a motion to stay arbitration, that such dissolution and distribution
of the contract to the corporate shareholders for completion, without Ehrlich's
consent, was a breach of the non-assignability clause, and that Unit Frame
had thus lost its arbitration right.
9. 2 N.Y.2d 493, 161 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1957).
10. Id., at 497, 161 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1957).
11. Supra note 4, at 710.
12. New York B.&E.R.R. Co. v. Motil, 81 Conn. 466, 71 A. 563 (1908).
13. 5 N.Y.2d 275, 184 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1959).
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The Court overturned the Appellate Division's decision,14 and entered
an order denying petitioner's motion to stay arbitration.
Under Section 29 of the New York General Corporation Law, and Sec-
tion 105(8) of the New York Stock Corporation Law, a dissolved corporation
continues in existence for the purpose of satisfying its existing obligations,
collecting assets and debts due the corporation, and winding up it's affairs.
Unit Frame thus could not assign its existing obligations under the contract
and remained liable for non-performance. 15 However, Section 105(7) of the
Stock Corporation Law requires a distribution to stockholders of remaining
assets, after adequately providing for the satisfaction of liabilities and obliga-
tions.16 Here, the agreement with the stockholders of Unit Frame, called for
the completion of the contract by them, hence an adequate provision for the
satisfaction of the corporate obligation. Therefore the distribution of the
corporate asset, i.e., the right to payment under the contract, was not only a
legitimate function of winding up, but also a statutory requirement., This
was not such a transfer or assignment, as was prohibited under the Ehrlich
contract.
Had the stockholders failed to complete the contract, Unit Frame could
not have claimed that its dissolution precluded Ehrlich from invoking the
arbitration provision, 18 since it remained liable on the obligation. It follows
that Ehrlich, after the completion of the contract, cannot avoid payment by
invoking the same dissolution as a bar.
The Court was fortified in their articulation of the problem, by the fact
that subsequently to the lower court's decision, Section 105(8) was amended to
expressly include participation in arbitration proceedings, as an incident of
dissolution. This amendment was viewed by the Court as merely declarative
of existing law.' 9
14. 5 A.D.2d 272, 171 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1st Dep't 1958). The apparent rationale in
the Appellate Division was, that since Unit Frame had dissolved and distributed the
contract to its stockholders, it no longer had an adequate interest therein. "The demand
for arbitration or payment cannot be made by the corporate entity which no longer has
an interest in the contract." at 275.
15. Matter of Delphi Mfg. Co., 15 Misc. 2d 337, 157 N.Y.S.2d 412 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
The Court said, "I am persuaded that a voluntary dissolution of a corporation, . . . does
not relieve it of its obligations or liabilities which had been incurred prior to dissolution
• . . even if the dissolution had occurred prior to the service of the notice to arbitrate."
at 338.
16. "... and after paying and adequately providing for the payment of such
liabilities and obligations, tor distribute the remainder of its assets among its stock-
holders ... "
17. Supra note 15, see also Hudak v. Hornell Industries, 304 N.Y. 207, 106 N.E.2d 609
(1952).
18. Matter of Kosoff, 276 App. Div. 621, 96 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1st Dep't 1950), aff'd
303 N.Y. 663, 102 N.E.2d 584, where it was said, "While it is true that a corporation is
deemed to continue in existence for the purpose of suit and therefore, it might be said that
the employer corporation should be deemed to continue for the purpose of arbitation
.," however, no arbitrable dispute existed.
19. N.Y. SEss. LAWS 1958, ch. 483.
